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Abstract
We employ a common agency model to examine how green lobbies a®ect the
determination of trade and environmental policy in two large countries that are
linked through trade °ows and transboundary pollution. We show that, when
governments are not restricted in their ability to use trade barriers, environmen-
tal lobbying always results in higher pollution taxes relative to a no-lobbying
scenario. Consequently, uncoordinated environmental policies are closer to the
e±cient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated policies. If, how-
ever, governments are bound by international trade rules, green lobbies may
bias environmental policies downwards and environmental policy coordination is
unambiguously e±ciency-enhancing.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine how the presence of green lobbies can a®ect the determination
of trade and environmental policies when countries are linked through trade °ows and
transboundary pollution. We show that the impact of green lobbies on the compar-
ative e±ciency of unilateral and cooperative environmental policy outcomes depends
crucially on the trade policy regime.
It is widely recognized that the key to solving transboundary environmental prob-
lems is international cooperation. In the absence of cooperation, there is a presumption
that green lobbies might act as a partial remedy, by exerting political pressure in favor
of higher pollution taxes. In recent years, green lobbies have grown in size1 and have
become increasingly important actors in environmental politics. They exercise pressure
on national governments as well as on supra-national institutions such as the World
Bank, the World Trade Organization or the EU (Charter and Del¶eage, 1998). They
are also active participants in all international trade and environmental negotiations.2
In this paper, we argue that, when applied to large countries, the presumption that
green lobbies always bias environmental policies upwards can be misleading. This is
because an increase in pollution taxes by one country improves the terms of trade in
favor of the other country, leading to an increase in its production levels and emissions.
We show that when trade policies are bound by international agreements or otherwise
constrained, this leakage e®ect of environmental policy would actually result in rational
environmental groups lobbying for lower domestic pollution taxes.
We employ a common agency model of lobbying of the kind introduced by Gross-
man and Helpman (1994). Green lobbies confront their governments with contribution
1In the US, for example, the Environmental Defense Fund has 151 permanent sta® and an annual
budget of $23 m, Greenpeace (US) has 250 and $12 m, and the Natural Resource Defense Counsel 165
and $18 m.
2For example, at the Kyoto Conference on greenhouse emissions in December 1997, several green
NGOs were represented (Greenpeace alone sent a 18-strong delegation). They \had considerable
in°uence on the negotiations (and) served as sounding-board to assess how proposals would be received
at home" (Financial Times, December 11, 1997). More recently, in°uential environmental groups such
as Friends of the Earth launched a ¯erce campaign against the new round of GATT/WTO negotiations
in Seattle (The Economist, December 11, 1999).
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schedules, namely functions relating their binding promise of political support to the
selected policies. Incumbent politicians are semi-benevolent, in that they choose trade
and environmental policy to maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and total polit-
ical contributions. The model is used to characterize unilateral and cooperative policy
equilibria and compare their relative e±ciency. As a benchmark, we consider the poli-
cies chosen in a cooperative manner by benevolent politicians, who do not care about
lobbies' contributions.
We ¯nd that, when governments can use trade barriers to counteract the leakage
e®ect of environmental policy, green interest groups always lobby for higher pollution
taxes. Consequently, uncoordinated environmental policies are closer to the e±cient
Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated environmental policies. However,
when international trade rules restrain the possibility of trade intervention at the na-
tional level, if the spillovers and leakage e®ects are large enough, environmentalists
lobby for lower pollution taxes and international coordination of environmental poli-
cies is unambiguously e±ciency enhancing.
Does the presence of green lobbies with a strong in°uence on policy makers weaken
the need for a World Environmental Organization (WEO)? Our analysis suggests that
the answer to this question depends crucially on the degree of existing trade policy
coordination and on the magnitude of the leakage and spillover e®ects. Countries that
are already cooperating over trade policy could gain by cooperating over environmental
policy too. On the other hand, countries that have not committed to trade cooperation
should set environmental policy in a unilateral manner.
Our analysis presents some similarities with work by Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt
(1998), who apply the common agency approach to study the e®ect of lobbying in
the determination of environmental policy.3 However, since their studies focus on
local environmental problems in a small open economy, they live aside the issues of
pollution spillovers, policy leakages and international cooperation, which are central to
3Fredriksson (1997) incorporates into his model a pollution abatement subsidy, showing that pollu-
tion may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate. Aidt (1998) assumes that a production
externality arises from the use of a factor input. His analysis generalizes Bhagwati's principle of tar-
geting to distorted political markets: the most e±cient instrument to internalize the externality is a
tax on the polluting input factor, which aims directly at the source.
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our analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 examines the relative e±ciency of unilateral and cooperative environmental
policies in the absence of preexisting international trade agreements. Section 4 consid-
ers the case of governments that are bound by international trade rules and that can
only decide whether or not to cooperate over environmental policy. Finally, Section 5
provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economy
We begin by describing a simple model of international trade and transboundary pol-
lution in which two countries, denominated home (no*) and foreign (*), produce and
trade many goods. We will focus on the political and economic structure of the home
country; the structure of the foreign country can be derived symmetrically.
There are N +1 competitive sectors, i = 0; 1; : : : ; N , where 0 denotes a non-traded
numeraire good. All goods are produced with conventional constant returns to scale
technology. The numeraire good is produced using labor alone and units are chosen so
that its price equals unity in both countries. We assume that aggregate labor supply,
l, is large enough to be able to produce a positive amount of good 0. This implies that
in a competitive equilibrium the wage rate equals unity. Production of non-numeraire
goods requires labor, and sector-speci¯c capital, which is available in ¯xed supply.
Domestic consumer and producer prices of non-numeraire goods are given by qi
and pi, respectively. International prices are denoted by ¼i. With a wage rate equal
to unity, the aggregate rent accruing to the speci¯c factor in sector i depends only on
the producer price of the good, i.e. ¦i(pi). By Hotelling's Lemma, industry supply
is given by Yi(pi) = @¦i=@pi. The production of good i generates pollution emissions
Ei = ®iYi, where ®i is an exogenously given emission coe±cient.
The economy is populated by M identical individuals, h = 0; 1; : : : ;M , who have
identical preferences. Preferences are quasilinear and additively separable. Thus, indi-
vidual h's utility can be written as
uh(c0; : : : ; cN ; Zh) ´ c0 +
NX
i=1
ui(ci) ¡ Zh; (1)
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where c0 is the consumption of the numeraire good, and the functions ui(:) are twice-
di®erentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. The last term represents the environ-
mental damage su®ered by consumer h, which is a function of domestic and foreign
emissions: 4
Zh(p;p¤) ´
NX
i=1
µi®iYi +
NX
i=1
(1 ¡ µi)®¤iY ¤i ; µi < 1; (2)
where p and p¤ are vectors of producer prices and µi and (1¡µi) are the relative weights
that individuals associate with domestic and foreign emissions in sector i, respectively.
Notice that the restriction µi < 1 implies the existence of transboundary pollution.
The government sets trade and environmental policy, which are restricted to two
policy instruments: speci¯c trade taxes or subsidies (¿i), and output taxes or subsidies
(ti).5
The (inverse) demand function for good i can be expressed as a function of price
alone, i.e. Di(qi). The indirect utility function corresponding to (1) can be obtained
as follows:
Vh(q;p;p¤) ´ lh +
NX
i=1
¸hi ¦i(pi) +
1
M
NX
i=1
tiYi(pi) +
1
M
NX
i=1
¿i
h
Y ¤i (p
¤
i ) ¡D¤i (q¤i )
i
+
NX
i=1
u
³
Di(qi)
´ ¡ NX
i=1
qiDi(qi) ¡ Zh(p;p¤):
(3)
The ¯rst three terms represent income, which consumer h receives from three sources.
First, she supplies her endowment of labor to the competitive market, receiving the
wage income lh. Second, she owns a share ¸hi of a speci¯c capital in sector i. Third, each
consumer receives 1=M of environmental and trade revenues, as a lump sum transfer.
The next two terms represent consumer surplus and the last is environmental damage.
4In some cases, the concern about foreign emissions could derive from physical spillovers and be
motivated by self-interest (e.g. ozone depletion, or carbon dioxide emissions); in other cases, it could
derive from psychological spillovers and be motivated by aesthetic, altruistic or paternalistic reasons
(e.g. foreign activities that endanger some species).
5Then t < 0 (t > 0) represents an output subsidy (tax), and ¿ < 0 (¿ < 0) indicates an export
subsidy (tax).
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Trade and environmental policy drive a wedge between consumer and producer
prices and between domestic and international prices, respectively. Consumer prices
are thus equal to qi = ¼i + ¿i, while producer prices are given by pi = ¼i + ¿i ¡ ti. For
each traded good i, world product markets clear when
Di(¼i; ¿i) ¡ Yi(¼i; ¿i; ti) +D¤i (¼i; ¿¤i ) ¡ Y ¤i (¼i; ¿ ¤i ; t¤i ) = 0: (4)
From (4) we can derive an expression for world equilibrium prices as a function of the
policies in the two countries, i.e. ¼i(ti; ¿; t¤i ; ¿ ¤i ).
2.2 The Political Arena
In order to isolate the impact of green lobbying on the determination of trade and envi-
ronmental policy, we shall assume that only a subset of citizens, the environmentalists,
can in°uence the government.6
Environmentalists organize lobby groups in a subset j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; L, of industry sec-
tors.7 Green lobbies are assumed to be functionally specialized, i.e. they are only
concerned with environmental protection.8 Each lobby j is formed by Mj members
with identical preferences and its objective function is given by
WEj (qj ; pj; q
¤
j ; p
¤
j ) ´ K ¡ sjM
h
Zj(qj; pj; q¤j ; p
¤
j )
i
; (5)
where K is a constant and sj ´ Mj=M is the share of the total population organized
in lobby j.
Green lobbies in°uence government action by setting contribution schedules C(t; ¿ )
that link their political support to the vector of policy choices of the government. Con-
tributions should be interpreted broadly as bribes, campaign funds, or support demon-
strations, to re°ect di®erent strategies used by green lobbies (Charter and Del¶eage,
6The interaction between environmental and industry lobbies is analyzed by Aidt (1998) and
Fredriksson (1997).
7We focus on single-issue organizations, committed to causes that are restricted by sector. However,
our analysis could be applied to multi-issue green lobbies such as Greenpeace, whose mandate is to
oppose environmental degradation wherever it might happen and in whatever form it might take.
8Aidt (1998) distinguishes between functionally specialized interest groups and interest groups with
multiple goals.
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1998). The contribution schedules will not be formal contracts, nor will they be ex-
plicitly announced. However, the government will know that an implicit link exists
between the way it treats each organized lobby and the contributions it can expect to
receive from that group. The implicit assumption is that lobbies keep their promises.9
The implicit objective of incumbent politicians is to be reelected; this implies that
they care about the utility level achieved by the median voter, particularly if voters
are well informed about the e®ects of government policy and base their vote partly
on their standard of living. Incumbent politicians also value lobbies' contributions for
¯nancing future campaigns and deterring competitors. Thus the government sets trade
and environmental policy so as to maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and total
political contributions:
G ´ aW (t; ¿; t¤; ¿ ¤) +
LX
j=1
Cj(t; ¿ ; t¤; ¿ ¤) a ¸ 0; (6)
where a is the government's weighting of every dollar of social welfare compared to a
dollar of campaign contributions.10 Social welfare is de¯ned as aggregate income plus
total consumer surplus minus total environmental damage:
W (q;p;q¤;p¤) = l +
NX
i=1
¦i(pi) +
NX
i=1
tiYi(pi) +
NX
i=1
¿i
h
Y ¤i (p
¤
i ) ¡D¤i (q¤i )
i
+M
h NX
i=1
u(Di(qi)) ¡
NX
i=1
qiDi(qi)
i ¡MZ(p;p¤):
(7)
In order to derive the equilibrium cooperative policies, we also need to de¯ne the ob-
jective function of a mediator or supra-national government. The policies that emerge
from international negotiations must be such that G could not be raised without low-
ering G¤. This implies that the governments choose the environmental policy vectors
9It is hard to achieve this commitment in a one-shot game, but in a dynamic context reputation
considerations could enforce it.
10As noted by Grossman and Helpman (1994), the welfare function of the government could be
written as ~G = a1
P
Ci2L + a2(Wi ¡ PCi2L), where a1 represents the weight that the politicians
attach to campaign contributions and a2 is the weight attached to net social welfare. Maximizing ~G
is equivalent to maximizing G in (6) with a = a2=(a1 ¡ a2), provided a1 > a2.
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to maximize the weighted sum
a¤G+ aG¤ = a¤a
h
W (t; ¿; t¤; ¿¤) +W ¤(t¤; ¿ ¤; t; ¿ )
i
+
a¤
LX
j=1
Cj(t; ¿; t¤; ¿¤) + a
L¤X
j=1
Cj(t¤; ¿ ¤; t; ¿ ):
(8)
In other words, the equilibrium policies are the same that would arise if a single decision
maker had the preferences given on the right hand side of (8) and the organized lobbies
of both countries bid to in°uence this agent's decisions.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1995), we model political competition as a two-
stage game. In the ¯rst stage, green lobbies simultaneously confront politicians with
their contribution schedules, which are assumed to be continuous and di®erentiable, at
least around the equilibrium. In the second stage, the two governments set trade and
environmental taxes and receive the contribution associated with the selected policies.
They either act unilaterally or in a cooperative manner.
We focus on the e±cient equilibrium of a common agency model, i.e. an equilibrium
which is e±cient for both the principals (green interest groups) and the agent (the
incumbent government). The existence of such an equilibrium has been demonstrated
by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). We leave out the derivation of the equilibrium of
a common agency game, which can be found in Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995),
Dixit (1996) and Fredriksson (1997).
A common agency game has typically many equilibria. As suggested by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986), we focus on \truthful" equilibria, where lobbies make contribu-
tions up to the point where the resulting change in economic policies is exactly o®set
by the marginal cost of the contributions.11
2.3 The Role of Green Lobbies
There is a presumption that environmentalists would always lobby in favor of higher
domestic pollution taxes, thus counteracting the international environmental distor-
11Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that only truthful contributions yield coalition-proof Nash
equilibria.
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tion. Here we argue that in the case of large countries environmentalists may actually
lobby in favor of lower pollution taxes, increasing the ine±ciency of unilateral environ-
mental outcomes. We show that this might happen when the countries are bound by
a free trade agreement, given su±ciently large policy leakages and emission spillovers.
Suppose that the home country increases its pollution tax on good j.12 This leads
to an increase in the international price of this good equal to
¡ @Y=@p
@D=@q ¡ @Y=@p+ @D¤=@q¤ ¡ @Y ¤=@p¤ ´ ±; 0 < ± < 1: (9)
If the two countries are already bound by a free trade agreement, the leakage e®ect
of environmental policy cannot be counteracted by the use of import tari®s. In this
case, an increase in the pollution tax by the home country has a direct e®ect on domestic
emissions (which fall by @Y=@p(±¡1)) and an indirect e®ect on foreign emissions (which
increase by @Y ¤=@p¤±), due to the change in the terms of trade. From (5), it follows
that a unilateral increase in pollution taxes in sector j has an ambiguous e®ect on the
welfare of green lobby j:
@WE=@t = sM
h
µ@Y=@p(± ¡ 1) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)@Y ¤=@p¤±i: (10)
The ¯rst term in the parenthesis re°ects the welfare gain due to a fall in domestic
emissions, while the second term represents the welfare loss su®ered by the lobby
because of the increase in foreign emissions. Notice that, since 0 < ± < 1, the increase
in foreign emissions is larger than the fall in domestic emissions. The overall e®ect
depends on the relationship between the leakage coe±cient (±) and the coe±cient of
emission spillovers (µ): environmentalists gain (lose) from a higher (lower) pollution
tax if µ > ± ( if µ < ±); in the case where µ = ±, they are indi®erent, since their welfare
is una®ected by changes in environmental policy.
3 Trade and Environmental Outcomes
In this section, we consider a situation where governments can set both trade and
environmental policy. In Section 4, we will examine the case where they have already
12For notational simpli¯cation, in the remainder of the paper we omit the sectoral subscript.
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committed to trade cooperation, and can only decide whether or not to coordinate
their environmental policies.
In making the comparison, we assume that the two countries are symmetric13 and we
set the weights a; a¤ in the objective function of the governments equal to unity.14 As a
benchmark, we consider the policies that would be chosen cooperatively by benevolent
politicians. The social optimum thus implies free trade (i.e. ¿ = ¿ ¤ = 0) and the
adoption of the e±cient Pigouvian taxes tP , which re°ect the social marginal damage
of emissions:
tP = t¤P = ®M: (11)
A key feature of our model is that, given the symmetries assumption, the two countries
will adopt identical import tari®s. Consequently, in equilibrium there will be no trade,
independently of the policies adopted, and no allocative distortions other than those
associated with uninternalized externalities. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we
shall characterize the comparative e±ciency of environmental policy outcomes simply
in terms of their distance from the optimal Pigouvian taxes.15
3.1 Trade and Environmental Wars
Let us ¯rst consider the case where governments set their policies independently. Sub-
stituting the partial derivatives obtained from (7) and (5) into the ¯rst-order conditions
for noncooperative political equilibria, we can derive the following expressions for uni-
lateral policies:
tNC = t¤NC = ®M(1 + s)µ (12)
13This implies that in every sector of the economy Y = Y ¤, D = D¤, ± = ±¤, ® = ®¤ and µ = µ¤. It
also implies that the the supra-national mediator gives the same weight to the two countries (a = a¤).
14This implies that governments value a dollar of campaign contributions twice as much as a dollar
of social welfare.
15In the case of policies that lie on the same side of the optimum, the distance from the Pigouvian
taxes can be unambiguously interpreted as a welfare measure. This is also the case for policies
that lie on di®erent sides of the optimum, if the welfare function is symmetric with respect to the
environmental tax.
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and
¿NC = ¿ ¤NC =
®M(1 + s)(µ ¡ 1)@Y=@p
@D=@q ¡ @Y=@p : (13)
From (13) we can see that the two countries will set identical import tari®s. Thus in
equilibrium trade policy has no e®ect on relative prices and welfare.
In terms of environmental policy, it is clear from (12) that green lobbying creates
a bias towards higher pollution taxes. This should not be surprising, as taxing home
production leads to a decrease in domestic emissions and, when combined with appro-
priate import tari®s, has no e®ect on foreign emissions. As the share s of citizens who
are members of a green lobby increases, equilibrium pollution taxes in the organized
sector increase. Also note that the larger are emission spillovers (i.e. the lower is µ),
the lower are equilibrium pollution taxes.
Lemma 1 When the governments are not bound by a free trade agreement, uncoor-
dinated environmental taxes in the organized sectors are socially optimal if and only
if s = 1=µ ¡ 1. In this case, the domestic political distortion (green lobbying) exactly
o®sets the international environmental distortion (emission spillovers).
PROOF: Given s = 1=µ¡1, unilateral environmental taxes coincide with the Pigouvian
taxes, i.e. tNC = tP = ®M . Q.E.D.
3.2 Trade and Environmental Talks
International trade and environmental negotiations lead to the adoption of the following
cooperative policies:
tC = t¤C = ®M(1 + s); (14)
and
¿C = ¿ ¤C = 0: (15)
The following result immediately follows from the analysis of expression (14):
Lemma 2 Internationally coordinated pollution taxes in the organized sectors are al-
ways higher than the optimal Pigouvian taxes.
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PROOF: When a share s of the population organizes a green lobby, tC > tP = ®M .
Cooperative taxes are equal to the Pigouvian taxes if and only if s = 0, i.e. if no citizen
is a member of a green lobby. Q.E.D.
Combining Lemma 1 and 2, it is evident that e±cient Pigouvian taxes can only
be achieved in an uncoordinated framework. However, the question we really want to
address is one of second-best nature: would the environmental policies set by individual
governments be more or less e±cient than those set by a supra-national authority?
Comparison between (12) and (14) allows us to state our ¯rst proposition:
Proposition 1 When governments are not bound by a free trade agreement, uncoor-
dinated environmental policies in the organized sectors are more e±cient than inter-
nationally coordinated policies.
PROOF: Subtracting (11) from (12), we obtain a measure of the e±ciency of unilateral
taxes:
tNC ¡ tP = ®M
h
µ(1 + s) ¡ 1i; (16)
while the corresponding expression for cooperative policies is:
tC ¡ tP = ®Ms: (17)
The di®erence between (16) and (17) gives us a measure of the relative e±ciency of
uncoordinated pollution taxes compared with internationally negotiated taxes:
´ = ®M(1 + s)(µ ¡ 1): (18)
Since ´ < 0, noncooperative environmental policies are always closer to the Pigouvian
taxes than cooperative ones. Q.E.D.
We may thus conclude that, when governments can use trade barriers to o®set the
trade-related e®ects of environmental policy, uncoordinated pollution taxes are always
closer to the e±cient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated taxes. It
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should be noted that this result hinges on the assumption that green lobbies have
su±ciently strong in°uence on the the decision making process.16
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that, if politicians are more concerned about
political contributions than social welfare, the bias towards higher pollution taxes
caused by the political distortion (green lobbying) counteracts the downwards bias
caused by the environmental distortion (pollution spillovers), making uncoordinated
policies more e±cient than in a no-lobbying scenario (and equal to the ¯rst-best so-
lution when the two distortions exactly o®set each other as described in Lemma 1).
At the level of international negotiations, however, green lobbying distorts upwards
policies that would otherwise be optimal.
4 Environmental-only Outcomes
Next, we examine the comparative e±ciency of noncooperative and cooperative envi-
ronmental policy outcomes, assuming the two governments have already committed to
trade policy coordination. This scenario could, for example, apply to members of a
regional trade agreement like the European Union or to countries that are e®ectively
bound by GATT/WTO rules.
4.1 Environmental Wars
Equilibrium environmental policies emerging from decentralized decision-making are
given by
~tNC = ~t¤NC =
®M(1 + s)(± ¡ µ)
± ¡ 1 : (19)
Comparing equation (11) and (19), we obtain the following result:
Lemma 3 When governments are bound by a free trade agreement, uncoordinated poli-
cies in the organized sectors are socially optimal if s = (µ¡ 1)=(±¡ µ); they are higher
(lower) than the optimal Pigouvian taxes if s > (<)(µ ¡ 1)=(± ¡ µ).
16Recall that we set the weights a; a¤ in the objective function of the governments equal to unity,
which implies that incumbent politicians value a dollar of campaign contributions twice as much as a
dollar of social welfare.
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PROOF: The distance between the Pigouvian taxes and the equilibrium noncooperative
taxes is given by
~tNC ¡ tP =
®M
h
µ(1 + s) ¡ ±s¡ 1i
1 ¡ ± : (20)
Setting expression (20) equal to zero and solving for s, we ¯nd that unilateral policies
are equal to the ¯rst best if
s =
µ ¡ 1
± ¡ µ : (21)
It is easy to verify that (20) is positive for s > (µ ¡ 1)=(± ¡ µ) and negative for
s < (µ ¡ 1)=(± ¡ µ). Q.E.D.
The most striking result from the analysis of (19) is described by the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 When (± > µ), green lobbying creates a bias towards lower unilateral
pollution taxes.
PROOF: When the leakage coe±cient is larger than the spillover coe±cient (± > µ),
expression (19) is negative, implying that governments subsidize domestic production
(~tNC < 0). To understand this result, recall from equation (10) that a unilateral
increase in emission taxes has an ambiguous e®ect on the welfare of environmental
lobby:
@WE=@t = sM
h
µ@Y=@p(± ¡ 1) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)@Y ¤=@p¤±i: (22)
Given ± > µ, expression (22) is negative, implying a welfare loss for the green lobby.
The latter will thus o®er political contributions in favor of lower pollution taxes. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 is in contrast with Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998), who examine
the determination of environmental policy in a small open economy and argue that
green lobbies would always bias pollution taxes upwards. Our analysis shows that this
argument can be misleading when applied to large countries, since the existence of
terms of trade e®ects and pollution spillovers can lead environmental groups to o®er
political contributions in favor of lower pollution taxes.
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4.2 Environmental Talks
The ¯rst-order conditions for cooperative environmental equilibrium policies yield the
same equilibrium policies as in equation (14):
~tC = ~t¤C =M®(1 + s): (23)
Therefore Lemma 2 also applies to the case in which governments have previously
committed to trade policy coordination.
The comparison between (19) and (23) allows us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When governments are in°uenced by green lobbies and bound by inter-
national trade agreements, environmental policy coordination is e±ciency enhancing if
and only if ± > µ.
PROOF: For unilateral and cooperative policy outcomes to be equally e±cient, the
following equality must hold:
tP ¡ ~tNC = ~tC ¡ tP = aMs: (24)
Substituting (19) and (23) into (24), we ¯nd that unilateral and cooperative policies
are equally distant from the e±cient Pigouvian solution when:
± =
s+ µ + sµ ¡ 1
2s
: (25)
It is straightforward to verify that cooperative environmental taxes are more e±cient
than uncoordinated taxes if and only if ± > (s + µ + sµ ¡ 1)=2s. Notice that function
(25) is monotonically increasing in s, and lies between ¡1 and µ.17 Therefore, when
± > µ it must be true that ± > (s+ µ + sµ ¡ 1)=2s, i.e. ~tc ¡ tP < tP ¡ ~tnc. Q.E.D.
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that, in a situation where governments are not
allowed to use trade barriers and there are large enough emission spillovers and terms
of trade e®ects, environmental policy coordination is more e±cient than decentralized
decision making. This is because, due to the trade-related leakage e®ect of environ-
mental taxes, green interest groups lobby their governments in favor of lower pollution
taxes, thus exacerbating (instead of counteracting) the international environmental
distortion.
17Equation (25) implies that lims!0 ± = ¡1, and lims!1 ± = µ.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed an analytical framework to investigate how the presence
of strong green lobbies in°uences the comparative e±ciency of unilateral and cooper-
ative environmental policies. We have focused our analysis on two large symmetric
countries that are linked through trade °ows and transboundary pollution.
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows:
² The impact of green lobbies on the comparative e±ciency of unilateral and co-
operative environmental policies depends on the type of trade regime and on the
magnitude of the leakage and spillover e®ects;
² In the absence of preexisting international trade agreements, green lobbying bias
pollution taxes upwards. Consequently, uncoordinated pollution taxes are closer
to the e±cient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated taxes;
² If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, and the emission
spillovers and leakage e®ects are large enough, green lobbying bias unilateral
pollution taxes downwards. In this case, environmental policy coordination is
unambiguously e±ciency enhancing.
Does the presence of green lobbies with a strong in°uence on policy makers weaken
the need for environmental policy coordination? Our analysis suggests that the answer
to this question depends crucially on the strength of international trade rules. On
the one hand, countries that are already cooperating over trade policy could gain by
coordinating their environmental policies too, at least in those sectors of the economy
characterized by large emission spillovers and leakage e®ects. On the other hand, coun-
tries that have not committed to trade cooperation should choose their environmental
policies in a unilateral manner.
The institutional implication of these results is that, when environmental groups
are politically organized, the need to create a World Environmental Organization
(WEO) depends on the strength of the World Trade Organization. The existence
of GATT/WTO rules which restrict governments' ability to use trade barriers would
suggest the need for a WEO. However, if GATT/WTO rules are not binding18 green
18GATT obligations are eroded by the fact that countries are able to invoke many exceptions to
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lobbying at the national level could replace international coordination of environmental
policies under a WEO.
The analytical framework described in this paper is highly simpli¯ed and the results
obtained must be interpreted with great caution. More work is needed to examine
how economic policy, including environmental policy, is determined by political and
economic interests.
First, the common agency approach leaves two crucial issues aside: it does not
explain why only some groups of citizens overcome the free-rider problem of collective
action described by Olson (1965) and become politically organized; and it does not
model the underlying electoral process, failing to provide clear microfoundations for
the government's objective function. Second, it would be relevant to consider the im-
pact of lobbying by producer groups. Their pressure for lower pollution taxes could
counteract the in°uence of environmental groups (when they lobby for higher pollution
taxes) or reinforce it (when they lobby for lower pollution taxes). In both cases, uni-
lateral environmental policies would become less e±cient compared to internationally
coordinated policies. Finally, a model with symmetric countries does not capture the
North-South divide which often characterizes international environmental relations.
By relaxing the symmetry assumption, one could extend our analysis to consider the
interaction between countries with di®erent economic and political structures.
them. Examples are exceptions for health, welfare, and national security reasons (Articles XX and
XXI), the General Waivers (Article XXV), or antidumping and countervailing duties (Articles VI).
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